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POLITICAL SCIENCE 
United States Foreign Policy: 
An Appraisal of Globalism 
WILLIAM 0. PETERFI* 
ABSTRACT - Many scholars and citizens agree that recent United States foreign policy has led 
the country into global involvement, but there is wide disagreement as to the implications of 
this. In this appraisal of the general concept of globalism the author hopes to show that, no 
matter how the United States got involved in global politics, it can in a way be justified on the 
basis of the national interest and that, although there is an urgent need for change in U.S. 
foreign policy, it cannot now be done on a unilateral basis. 
Perhaps no other single issue of contemporary Ameri-
can life has received greater exposure in the last decade 
than the continuous discussion of United States foreign 
policy. What was described not so long ago as a "political 
desert" (Morgenthau, 1952: 4) has grown into a chain 
of oases where almost endless debate is carried on by 
travelers-scholars venturing into the once-barren sands 
of American foreign policy. The discussion is indeed 
the business of the entire nation today. There must be 
some apparent causes for this sudden change in interest 
among the people of the United States toward the mak-
ing, execution, and subsequent interpretations of the na-
tion's foreign policy. 
Public expression about foreign policy often reaches 
proportions of passionate self-torturing, to expiate real 
or imagined guilt, and the extreme attitudes seem to 
preclude dialogue between opposing opinions based upon 
the basic principles of majority rule and the idea of 
compromise. 
Regardless of the reasons for attitudinal change, Amer-
ican foreign policy has become, unlike that of most other 
nations, a peculiar combination of responsibilities to be 
shared by the executive and legislative branches of gov-
ernment, assisted by the citizenry. 
The main problem, it seems, is not the intense in-
volvement by the people nor the extremist positions 
which some assume, but the apparent chaos and anarchy 
prevailing over the entire range of the foreign policy 
debate. 
The following analysis does not propose any new so-
lutions but is rather an attempt to separate the major 
issues from the minor ones which have contributed much 
to the present state of confusion. William P. Gerberding, 
in the preface of his text on the subject, states his main 
reason for writing was to show "how to think, and not 
what to think about foreign policy," (Gerberding, 1966: 
ix). lt is my belief that most of the current confusion 
* The author received degrees of Doctor of Law and Doctor 
of Political Science from Budapest University in 1950. He was 
a Post-Doctoral Research FelJow in International Politics at 
Yale University in 1958-59, a Visiting Scholar in Politics at 
U.C.L.A. in 1959-60, and a Visiting Fellow in Politics at Prince-
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stems from the fallacious approach based on what people 
think or should think about foreign policy. So this es-
say is concerned primarily with the questions of how to 
think about United States foreign policy in general and 
how to interpret American globalism in particular. 
For practical purposes, the general scope of that policy 
can be appraised on both horizontal and vertical planes. 
The horizontal plane would encompass justification and 
interpretations based on the purpose of U.S. foreign 
policy, generally presuming a choice between the na-
tional interest or internationalism. On the vertical plane, 
the basic issues would appear to revolve around the ways 
and means of achieving that purpose through the appli-
cation of isolationism or interventionism. Both of these 
factors are overshadowed by the two almost mystical 
phenomena of political morality and political realism, the 
driving force and counterforce of the totality of this na-
tion's foreign policy. 
The Purpose: National Interest 
or Internationalism 
The relationship between foreign policy and national 
interest is explicit; the former being the recognized and 
accepted vehicle for the latter. Differences in interpre-
tation center around the question of how successfully 
U.S. foreign policy has served our national interest. 
Since World War II, great disagreement has developed 
on this issue. When the United States was still at the 
threshold of that war, Thomas A. Bailey could say: 
It seems clear that on the whole basic foreign 
policies of the United States have served the nation 
well, and that it would be unwise to cast them aside 
for transient reasons, ( Bailey, 1940: 7 66) . 
Then, in 1962, Hans J. Morgenthau, a defender of 
national interest and at the same time a severe critic of 
American foreign policy, wrote as follows: 
While the international position of the United 
States has (thus) suffered from the effects of uncon-
trollable circumstances, the foreign policies pursued 
by the United States in recent years have not only 
succeeded in counteracting these effects but actually 
aggravated them. If one should characterize in one 
sentence American foreign policy of recent years, 
one would have to say that it has stood still while 
the world has moved, ( Morgenthau, 1962: 68). 
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Realists will argue that the best defense is to devise 
foreign policies whose sole purpose is to protect the na-
tional interest. As Morgenthau remarked about Ameri-
can foreign policy: "Its purpose - its sole purpose -
ought to be . . . the security of the nation; security 
against the greatest danger that ever threatened the 
world" (Morgenthau, 1952: 88) 
Internationalists who cannot accept the national in-
terest as the purpose of U.S. foreign policy argue on the 
basic assumption that the best way to protect the United 
States is to put world interest above that of the nation. 1 
They argue that an interdependence exists in the world 
today, preventing one nation from going its own way 
without regard to the rest of the world. As Thomas I. 
Cook and Malcolm Moos pointed out: 
American national interest must be re-defined as 
its international interest, under which are com-
pounded the particular and the universal, power and 
ethics, the realism of idealism. For today security 
and sharing are interdependent, and the freedom 
and fulfillment of person, the central promise of in-
dustrial civilization, depends on both, (Cook and 
Moos, 1953: 44). 
One leading exponent of internationalism, Frank Tan-
nenbaum, proposes to substitute for the concepts of na-
tional interest and power politics his so-called "co-ordi-
nate state," based upon the equal sovereignty and dignity 
of all states of the international community. Tannenbaum 
proclaimed that the "co-ordinate state": 
has everything to do with the recognition that com-
promise is a continuing means of nonviolent friction 
(peace) . . . It is only if all the states continue to 
have equal dignity among themselves that changes 
in power and wealth can be absorbed without un-
due violence. This is the essence of federalism in 
international relations. The co-ordinate state rela-
tionship makes it possible to accept the inevitable 
growth of some and the decline of other states with-
out war and without the loss of "face," because the 
changes are gradual and absorbed through a process 
of accommodation by all the members who are equal 
to each other (Tannenbaum, 1952: 140). 
In addition to Morgenthau another leading realist, 
George F. Kennan,2 speaks in defense of the national 
interest as the guiding principle of the American Re-
public and an inherent part of her foreign policy from 
the beginning. As he put it, "the assurance of the national 
1 Among leading internationalists since the end of World War 
II, I count Frank Tannenbaum, lnis Claude, Grenville Clark, 
and Louis B. Sohn. It may be submitted, however, that because 
of our long tradition of interpreting foreign policy on the basis 
of national interest, internationalists have not received as wide 
recognition as could be expected on such an important issue. 
Between these two views would be a middle-of-the-road position, 
such as is taken by Arnold Wolfers and Senator J. William 
Fulbright. 
2 Kennan's position is somewhat unique. He recognizes the 
necessity for protection of the national interest, but he also 
comes out in favor of the judicious and limited internationalism 
for its continuous protection. 
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security and the promotion of private American activity 
abroad were all that really did flow directly and logically 
from the original objects of American society" (Ken-
nan, 1954: 12). 
Because of the debate, emphasis of the foreign policy 
controversy has shifted from the primary topic, the pur-
pose of the United States foreign policy, to the secondary 
topic, the justification of the same purpose. In other 
words, the paramount question is no longer whether the 
United States has a right to protect its national interest 
through foreign policy but how that national interest can 
best be protected. 
I believe Morgenthau touched upon the entire prob-
lem of secondary interpretations of the purpose of United 
States national interest when he posed the question-argu-
ment of the idealists-utopians as leveled against his the-
ory: 
It has been frequently argued against the realist 
conception of foreign policy that its key concept, the 
national interest, does not provide an acceptable 
standard for political action. This argument is in the 
main based upon two grounds: the illusiveness of 
the concept and its susceptibility to interpretations, 
such as limitless imperialism and narrow national-
ism which are not in keeping with the American 
tradition in foreign policy (Morgenthau, "Another 
Great Debate," 1952: 116). 
The "American tradition" thus appears to be the 
haunting, ever-present key issue in the general assess-
ment of U.S. history. How does one correlate political 
morality, an undeniable heritage, with political realism 
or expediency in defining the national purpose? Can 
the argument in favor of the national interest be justi-
,fied on moral grounds or can it even be justified on 
grounds of political realism? This is the first major ques-
tion followed by its antithesis : If the purpose of foreign 
policy is exclusively the protection of the national self-
interest, will or will not this theory and position be self-
defeating insofar as the rigid and exclusive adherence to 
the national interest of one country will evoke similar 
reaction by other countries, thus leading to conflict and 
war? 
Between those two extremes a synthesis is needed. The 
trap to these two questions is less than apparent : If the 
realists are right, then to all appearances it does not 
really matter whether the justification will be based on 
political morality or political realism. On the other hand, 
if the purpose of foreign policy is something else than 
the national interest, then whether its justification is 
based on political realism or political morality matters 
greatly. The core of the arguments is basically the same, 
but the two sides approach the issue from opposite ends. 
This is the ancient problem of the so-called "double 
standard" - each group attacking the other's theories in 
order to justify the correctness of its position vis a vis 
those views. Quoting Morgenthau again as he attacks 
the zeal of the one-sided moralist: 
(The crusader) projects the national moral stand-
ards into the international scene not only with the 
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legitimate claim of reflecting the national interest, 
but with the politically and morally unfounded 
claim of providing moral standards for all mankind. 
Through the intermediary of the universal moral 
appeal, the national and the universal interests be-
come one and the same thing. What is good for the 
crusading country is by definition good for all man-
kind; and if the rest of mankind refuses to accept 
such claims to universal recognition, it must be con-
verted with fire and sword (Morgenthau, 1952: 
37). 
Morgenthau has thus lashed out against sanctimonious 
justification of American involvement in foreign coun-
tries for the alteged protection of other people, which in 
reality was nothing less than the fostering of American 
interests. 
A Historical Point 
Charles A. Beard, in his study of national interest, 
made the point that it was not until the end of the nine-
teenth century that "the directors of foreign policy in the 
United States spoke of themselves as bound by moral 
obligation to embark upon projects for uplifting, civil-
izing or Christianizing other peoples beyond the con-
fines of the country" (Beard, 1934: 358). The main 
architect of this approach was President Woodrow Wil-
son. Beard's appraisal of the eight years of Wilsonian 
administration was summed up in the following: "Presi-
dent Wilson's declaration of foreign policy was based on 
assumptions of moral values as distinguished from na-
tional interest conceived in commercial terms" (Beard, 
1934: 377). Or, as Wilson himself proclaimed: "Only 
free peoples can hold their purposes and their honor 
steady to a common end and prefer the interest of man-
kind to any interest of their own" (Beard, 1934: 377). 
In Wilson, American internationalists at last had their 
anointed leader. However, even those who opposed 
Wilson and his policies would now utilize his ideas in 
support of their positions on American foreign policy 
and its general horizontal interpretations. Even Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, a staunch supporter of American im-
perialism, invoked moral principles for the justification 
of American national interests. So did Theodore Roose-
velt, who in a curious way combined moral principles 
and the "big stick" policy for the furthering of Amer-
ican power, as shown in his annual message to Congress 
in 1906: 
It is a mistake, and it betrays a spirit of foolish cyn-
icism, to maintain that all international governmen-
tal action is, and must ever be, based upon mere 
selfishness, and that to advance ethical reasons for 
such action is always a sign of hypocrisy . . . A 
really great nation must often act, and as a matter, 
of fact of<ten does act, toward other nations in a 
spirit not in the least of mere self-interest, but pay-
ing heed chiefly to ethical reasons . . . (Beard, 
1934: 374). 
This double standard of morality can best be inter-
preted with excerpts such as the words of Curtis D. Wil-
bur, Secretary of the Navy under President Coolidge. In 
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a speech to the Connecticut Chamber of Commerce he 
said: 
To defend America we must be prepared to defend 
its interests and our flag in every comer of the 
globe . . . World-wide interests require world-wide 
defense. An American child crying on the banks of 
the Y angtse a thousand miles · from the coast can 
summon the ships of the American Navy up that river 
to defend it from unj,ust assault. Any nation facing 
the sea can be called to account by our navy . . . 
(New York Times, May 8, 1928). 
At the end of World War II, Abe Fortas, then Under-
secretary of the Interior and presently an associate jus-
tice of the Supreme Court, told New York City College 
alumni: "We are the one nation in the world that can 
successfully assert the moral leadership necessary to 
guide the world to peace and civilized living" (New York 
Times, Nov. 18, 1945; Beard, 1946: 23). 
Statements like the above seem to have formed the 
basis of justifications for our foreign policy for expo-
nents and practitioners Acheson, Dulles, Finletter and 
others up to Dean Rusk. Yet those who in an increas-
ing number have become critical of this "double stand-
ard" interpretation and justification of United States for-
eign policy are reminded of the warning by Secretary of 
State Hughes, who in an address at Amherst College on 
June 18, 1924, condemned "writers who apparently make 
it their business to develop antagonism and to spread 
among the people of this country, who have no oppor-
tunities for judgment from personal knowledge, the no-
tion that our policies are imperialistic, that our influence 
is baleful, and that mutual respect and friendship are de-
creasing" (Moon, 1926: 407-8). 
It took some forty years before the American public 
was ready to question the validity of Hughes' thinking, 
and was willing to listen to, if not agree with, politically-
prominent critics of American foreign policy who de-
plored the "arrogance of American power." Senator J. 
William Fulbright of Arkansas, who did much to un-
leash the current tide of critical analysis of U.S. for-
eign policy, stated that "gradually but unmistakably 
America is showing signs of that arrogance of power 
which has afflicted, weakened and in some cases de-
stroyed great nations in the past" (Fulbright, 1966: 22). 
Morgenthau argued the point another way when he re-
futed the "double standards" of those who tried to jus-
tify United States policies on the basis of so-called 
"moral principles" (Morgenthau, 1952: 93). 
In conclusion, I maintain that the obvious reason for 
confusion regarding questions involving the national in-
terest and internationalism on the horizontal level of 
American foreign policy is tied primarily to what people 
think about American foreign policy. Steps for clarifica-
tion are being attemped by those who introduce new ap-
proaches to how to think about it. 
The Ways and Means: 
Isolationism or Interventionism 
Basically, isolationism may be defined as the complete 
self-reliance of a nation in its domestic and foreign at-
The Minnesota Academy of Science 
fairs, while interventionism may be considered the pre-
meditated and willful interference by one nation into the 
domestic and foreign affairs of another. Indiscriminate 
usage by many scholars of terms considered synonymou'> 
with isolationism and interventionism, such as non-inter-
vention, anti-imperialism, etc., has contributed to con-
fusion in defining the two basic concepts. 
It is said that the historical origin of American iso-
lationism goes back to Washington's Farewell Address 
of 1796. Since then there has developed a separate liter-
ature dealing with various interpretations of American 
isolationism mainly from the point of view of the par-
ticular interpreter himself. It has, however, been argued 
that only a few scholars have dealt correctly with the 
Farewell Address in a historical context, as it ought to 
be. Selig Adler formulated a cogent question when h:: 
asked: "Was Washington speaking to his contempo-
raries or to generations yet unborn?" and went on to an-
swer it by stating: "No matter how one answers this de-
batable question, it is safe to say that the Father of our 
Country made neutrality and non-intervention a national 
fixation" (Adler, 1957: 16). 
Washington did not speak explicitly of isolationism or 
non-intervention or neutrality, he merely warned Ameri-
cans to stay away from "entangling alliances." But the 
interpreter-scholar went to work, and the result was a 
new confusion in the interpretation of the vertical level 
of American foreign policy, the ways and means of its 
implementation. Despite the many interpretations, it can 
be stated with some justification that American political 
history had its two major periods of isolationism and in-
terventionism. For practical purposes, I would suggest 
that from its beginning until about the end of World 
War II, the U.S. adhered basically to a foreign policy of 
isolationism. Since World War II, however, this coun-
try's foreign policy can be described as interventionism 
with some flings at non-intervention and anti-imperial-
ism. 
A few examples are pertinent for illustrative purposes. 
The proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine was a com-
bination of interventionism and imperialism in a positive 
way, from the point of view of the United States, and 
non-interventionism from the point of view of European 
involvement vis a vis the United States. Definite imperial-
ism was shown during the Mexican and Spanish wars. 
Neutralism was exemplified in the period of the European 
Napoleonic wars and the two periods before the entry 
of the United States into World Wars I and II, respec-
tively. Interventionism, in its pure form, has been dem-
onstrated by American meddling into the international 
affairs of the Caribbean republics. Pacifism was evi-
denced in American mediation between Imperial Russia 
and Japan, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Washington 
Naval Treaty. All these movements of U.S. diplomacy 
were in accordance with the national interest, and were 
interpreted invariably on the basis of political realism or 
political morality. 
Second Phase of Policy 
The second phase of our foreign policy, following 
World War II, brought forward interventionism with 
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intermittent bits of imperialism, non-interventionism, and 
anti-imperialism. Since 1945, there has not been a major 
conflict in which the United States was not directly or 
indirectly involved. American armed forces were involved 
in World War II from 1941 to 1945 for a total of five 
years. Direct military involvement from 1945 to 1968 
totals nine years : three years in Korea and six years in 
Vietnam as of this writing. This does not include per-
manent military missions such as the stationing of Amer-
ican forces in Japan and Germany, nor the short-term 
appearances in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic. 
All these involvements of the United States were the di-
rect result of American foreign policy and should be de-
scribed as interventionism, in the strict interpretation of 
the term. 
The number of indirect interventions by the United 
States is large, although difficult to determine, and might 
vary according to justifications given. One could, for ex-
ample, consider American involvements in China and 
Cuba as indirect interventionism because American 
forces were not used in these conflicts in a direct way. 
American pressure upon Great Britain, France and Is-
rael in 1956 is another example, as are the Greek civil 
war (1946); the Italian national election (194 7) ; the 
Berlin blockade; Guatemala (1954); the Congo affair 
( 1961); and the Rhodesian involvement ( 1965) . On the 
other hand, clear-cut cases of American imperialism since 
the end of World War II are the acceptance through the 
United Nations trusteeship over Japanese islands in the 
Pacific (l 94 7) and the establishment of a global system 
of military alliances since 1949. There have been cases 
of American non-interventionist policies also, such as the 
Kashmir dispute; the East Berlin rising ( 1953); the Poz-
nan riots (1956); the Hungarian revolution (1956); and 
the Indonesian civil war ( 1965). Finally, American anti-
imperialism had as its shining example the granting of 
independence to the Philippines in 1946; and American 
support through the United Nations for liquidation of 
remaining colonial empires is well known. 
All the situations discussed above can be justified both 
on the basis of the United States national interest and on 
that of internationalism as the purpose of U .S. foreign 
policy. For example, the take-over of the former Japan-
ese islands was justified on the basis of political realism, 
although to the political moralist the action was objec-
tionable as a sign of resurgent American imperialism. 
The political realists could justify American non-involve-
ment in the Hungarian Revolution on the basis that ab-
stention served the national interest better at that time, 
yet the political moralists deplored non-intervention as 
a betrayal of high moral principles of the United States.a 
• An illustration of the impasse between the political moralist 
and the political realist on the different justifications for a given 
U.S. policy is expressed by Dean Acheson in his paper, "The 
Premises of American Foreign Policy." He argues that Ameri-
can problems could not be solved on the basis of "formal mor-
alistic rules," but if we approached our problem from the point 
of view of solving it, then these considerations are not impor-
tant. It is not that we consider the French , the Germans, or 
the British more desirable people than the Indians, the Burmese, 
or the Vietnamese, but that, at the time, the center of power in 
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While these examples demonstrate the complexity of 
the overall analysis and appraisal of American foreign 
policy in the context of isolationism versus intervention-
ism, I must conclude that more often than not it has 
been necessity which dictated the selection of one policy 
over the other, and that all actions were taken for the 
stated purpose of protecting national interest, whether 
consciously or unconsciously. 
Reality or Guilt by Association: 
American "Global,ism" 
Even the most ardent apologists for recent American 
foreign policy would not deny that the United States is 
today involved on the global scale in international af-
fairs. However, what must be investigated is whether 
U.S. foreign policy is responsible by design or by default 
for her present global involvement in wodd affairs. The 
next question, then, would be whether it has served the 
best interest of the United States and the world or has 
led to a much greater confrontation between the two 
super-powers. And the final question is what course 
American foreign policy should take into the ] 970's to 
remedy this situation. 
According to authors Stillman and Pfaff, globalism is: 
the general conviction that the affairs of the world 
today are to be understood in terms of a universal 
conflict in values - between freedom and unfree-
dom, reason and force, orderly progress and des-
potism. It is the belief that the United States, as the 
leading proponent of a system of free government, 
is obligated to use its power (its material power, 
but also its power of moral suasion and leadership) 
to dominate this worldwide conflict. The United 
States is held to be compelled to do this for its own 
security . . . but also in the general interests of 
mankind, (Stillman and Pfaff, 1967: 8). 
Actually, U.S. globalism and its moral, ideological, 
and philosophical justification began long before World 
War II. Beginnings are to be found in the Monroe Doc-
trine, a unilateral act for the protection of U.S. interest, 
which then was to stay out of conflict with major Euro-
pean colonial powers and seek free expansion in the 
Western Hemisphere. Between 1823 and 189 8, the rise 
of the United States to a world power status and the 
sense of a special mission for the world began to take 
form. It was this mission which eventually became a 
kind of second nature and found its expression in subse-
quent U.S. foreign policy. 4 
Americans not only believed in the above statements 
about themselves, but began to feel the rest of the world 
should think about America along similar lines. There 
was at last a real justification for American domestic and 
foreign policies derived from these appealing principles. 
the non-Communist world is in North America and Western 
Europe (Acheson in Hahn and Neff, 1960:412-413). 
·• Advocates of the "mission for America" idea were to be 
found in almost all walks of life, ranging from practical politi-
cians (Senators Albert J. Beveridge and Henry Cabot Lodge) to 
publicist-scholars (John Fiske and John W. Burgess) to military 
experts (Alfred Thayer Mahan) and even clergymen (Josiah 
Strong). 
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It was eventually the Wilson era which forced these prin-
ciples to make the world "safe for democracy." The post-
war disillusionment and sobering-up of the nation led to 
a temporary introverted self-gratification about the "un-
gratefulness" of the uncivilized world so recently saved 
from Teutonic domination. As a result, the U.S. indulged 
in a period of isolationism to prove that Americans could 
have a wonderful life of their own, whereas the other 
countries could not prosper without American leadership. 
The signs of ideological globalism in foreign policy 
and a general feeling and intoxication of power has been 
expressed in a text by Randolph Greenfield Adams, who 
wrote: 
Perhaps no country has risen to greatness in the 
family of nations with so little conscious attention 
to her foreign policy (Adams, 1924: 1). 
Then he added a word of caution, proclaiming: "The 
day is past, however, when the people of the United 
States can afford to disregard their foreign policy." 
What had been a more or less forgiveable juvenile 
boastfulness about American power showed itself in full-
est manhood and responsibility during World War II. 
Americans nevertheless became puzzled by the interna-
tional situation after the war when it was apparent that 
America had become the leader of the world, and her 
mere physical power demanded a seemingly permanent 
and unwavering leadership stance. As co-authors Herbert 
J. Spiro and Benjamin Barber remarked: "Until World 
War II America's foreign policy had succeeded without 
really trying; after the war no amount of trying seemed 
to bring success" (Spiro and Barber, 1967: 5). 
Three Postwar Principles 
The three announced principles of American foreign 
policy since the end of World War II have been: (1) 
fighting Communism, (2) protecting the national inter-
est, and ( 3) working toward peace, in that order. 
I am inclined to believe that while the aims might not 
be questionable, the order of preference is highly de-
batable. The order perhaps jeopardizes the national in-
terest, for it is overshadowed by the insistence of com-
bating Communism, which in turn mars the proclaimed 
efforts toward peace." 
It has been argued that American obsession with Com-
munism has altered the entire scope of our foreign policy. 
Since adoption of the policy of containment in 194 7, as 
the best way to protect U.S. interests, all administrations 
have used it. Whether the United States has sought in a 
conscious manner the leadership of the world is, if not 
a question of great importance, one of integrity, and 
should be answered in the negative. It is a historical fact 
that after World War II nobody could challenge Ameri-
can power. Had the United States harbored sinister de-
" George F. Kennan has recognized the immensity of the prob-
lem and also has outlined alternatives and their implications. 
He, indeed, made a presentation of the issues from the point of 
view of how to think about American-Soviet relations instead of 
what to think about them, and clearly realized that American 
relations to world Communism present "a crisis of opinions of 
such seriousness as to constitute of itself a great and present 
danger." 
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signs for world domination, nobody could have stopped 
her from realizing that goal. 
Addressing himself to the current U.S. involvement in 
Southeast Asia, Senator Fulbright, a leading critic of our 
contemporary foreign policy, stated: 
It is ironic that at the same time that the vestiges 
of the Monroe Doctrine are being fitfully liquidated, 
the United States should be formulating a similar 
doctrine of pre-eminent American responsibility for 
Asia. One wonders whether the "Asian Doctrine" 
will reap for the United States as rich a harvest of 
affection and democracy as has the Monroe Doc-
trine (Fulbright, 1966: 111). 
It would appear that all who profess concern about the 
future of the United States agree that protection of the 
national interest is paramount, but disagree on ways and 
means of achieving it. It would appear, also, that at least 
under the present international conditions, internation-
alism is clearly not the justification for American involve-
ment on a global scale. Even Morgenthau, defender of 
the national interest doctrine, feels that policy-makers of 
the United States may be endangering the national in-
terest by adopting an overly-rigid foreign policy against 
international Communism. What seems necessary is a 
new, deliberate and flexible approach which is not neces-
sarily one of withdrawal from world involvement, as Ful-
bright and others advocate, but a policy of imagination 
and instant responsiveness to the challenge of Commu-
nism. 
The current line of policy may not only endanger the 
long range national interest of the United States but also 
that of the whole world. In order to contain Communism, 
the United States had adopted a policy of the status quo, 
so aptly analyzed by Morgenthau: 
Our foreign policy since the end of the two world 
wars has had the over-all objective to prevent a 
change in the territorial status quo. The rationale 
for this policy is sound . . . 
We, however, are committed to the defense of the 
status quo pure and simple, that is, of any status 
quo regardless of its defensibility (Morgenthau, 
1962: 69). 
To conclude my investigation of American globalism, 
the following general observations are in order. The 
United States is involved on a global scale in contem-
porary world affairs, and it has not sought this role. 
Since, on the other hand, the Soviet Union also emerged 
as an international power after World War II, a confron-
tation on a global scale became unavoidable. The future 
of the United States was placed in jeopardy. This 
prompted the United States to reappraise its position in 
the world and accept the Soviet challenge by becoming 
the leader of the non-Communist world. Thus the ques-
tion of the conscious or guilt-by-association complex of 
American contemporary global involvement can be de-
cided in favor of an involuntary act on the part of the 
United States. In this respect, the feeling of guilt amounts 
to nothing less than the feeling of frustration among 
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Americans that this Communist challenge has not yet 
been terminated successfully. 
The development of the so-called bi-polar world can-
not be said to have served the best interest of the United 
States, nor of the world in general, because of the ever-
present danger of nuclear war between the two super-
powers. The energies of the United States have thus had 
to be devoted to that single problem, leaving little inter-
est in continuous peace on a global scale. 
Regarding new approaches to end the present impasse 
for solution of the Soviet challenge, I would agree with 
both Fulbright and Morgenthau that a reassessment of 
American foreign policy and its objectives is necessary. 
From the post-World War II developments on the in-
ternational scene, it should be obvious that even the 
super-powers can no longer conduct their foreign affairs 
without due regard to the objectives and interests of 
other nations, 1arge or small. Any foreign policy decisions 
will have worldwide implications today. The objectives 
and the means of achieving them are in direct relation to 
expected success or failure. This is what Charles Burton 
Marshal called the "limits of foreign policy": "A sound 
general understanding of the limits of foreign policy, 
avoiding excessive expectations, is therefore essential to 
the conduct of a sound foreign policy." (Marshall, 1954: 
13). 
Possible Goals and Risks 
It is on the basis of the recognition of the limits of 
foreign policy that a reappraisal ~f United States foreign 
policy should follow. The basic objectives of national 
survival should not be easily jeopardized because of some 
goals which cannot be realized without possible incal-
culable risks which do not even appear to be essential 
for survival. I am obviously referring here to the Ameri-
can obsession with almost every aspect of Communism. 
In my opinion, one positive step toward re-assessment 
of American foreign policy should definitely be a change 
in the order of preference of the three previously-men-
tioned underlying principles. The United States should 
concentrate more on the establishment of a peaceful 
world on a global plane; it should de-emphasize its rigid 
policy toward Communism and, through following the 
revised preference, should also be more capable of pro-
tecting its own national interest. 
As noted before, once the goals have been clearly de-
fined and the ways and means of working to achieve 
them agreed upon, the solutions can be sought. In the 
process, however, a continuous reappraisal and evalua-
tion of the goals and their relationship to possible results 
should be weighed in order to reduce the risk of failure. 
As Marshall pointed out: 
The goal aspect of foreign policy is essential. It is 
also the easiest part of the business. The difficult 
part comes not in figuring out what one would do 
if one could do everything one may wish to do . . . 
It comes in deciding what to do in the circum-
stances of being able to do only part of what one 
may wish to do. Here the making of foreign policy 
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reaches the vital level. Here success is courted. Here 
failure is risked. (Marshall, 1954: 30-31). 
Obviously, the United States cannot make any basic 
concessions on a unilateral basis, because this would im-
peril its national interest. There must be found a happy 
medium between the two possible extremes: unlimited 
pursuit of the national interest on the one hand, and uni-
lateral concession on the other. It is on this basis that I 
conclude that the urgent need for a reappraisal of Ameri-
can contemporary foreign policy, however essential, 
must proceed in the view of its overall global implica-
tions. If, as appears to be the case at present, a compro-
mise solution cannot be attempted nor achieved between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, then the United 
States, while continuously inviting and carrying on a 
dialogue for this purpose, must keep its guard and avoid 
making unilateral concessions. 
Finally, no matter what course American foreign pol-
icy may take in the near future, it would be presumptu-
ous at this point to apologize for or condemn it before 
it has its "day in court." 
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